i’ve hit that point where a memoir seems like the appropriate next step. that i couldn’t spell “appropriate” or “step” and spelled out “mamryoir”, says a lot about the challenges i’d be facing and the direction any distractions will take. there’s got to be an easier way to make a buck…

PLEASE IGNORE ALL VIDEO ADDS BELOW THIS BLOG

PLEASE IGNORE ALL VIDEO ADDS BELOW THIS BLOG

Resource Dependence observes power deriving from relationship, seen directly in terms of dependence (power comes from someone’s dependence on me) – not as the result of traditionally understood qualities of charismatic leadership, which is a strong component of the Cultural/Cognitive Perspective. While Resource Dependence observes dependence as the objective bottom line that defines action, not as a subjective cultural construct who’s importance varies due to context and framing, the Cultural/Cognitive Perspective has noted that leadership, power, resources and money have “changed hands” depending on how problems are framed within an Organization. It has been noted (Fligstein) that the dominate perspective of problems- and-solutions exist concurrently with a similar orientation of internal power brokers like company presidents and CEO’s. Individuals and subunits that are able to convince an organization that their ideas and particular qualities (accounting; marketing; finance) are essential, gain organizational power and control.

Furthermore, rational decision-making is not reflected in organizational behavior, which is an important assumption of Resource Dependence theory. Fligstein, Meyer & Rowen, DiMaggio & Powell have all described the extent to which organizational behavior is dominated by non-rational processes that are based on perspective and framing. If what is important is a cultural construct- then considerations of dependence are no more objective than anything else. While Resource Dependence might call soft-skill characteristics subjective and unimportant, there is impressive evidence that cultural framing determines organizational reality, and soft skills greatly influence who’s framing is dominate within organizations.

Burt, RS “Structural Holes and Good Ideas”: considers social networks as existing inside of formal organizations, which by nature creates structural boundaries to networking (structural holes) that negatively impact new ideas and innovation by limiting the social exposure of its actors. Burt states that social capital comes from a heterogeneous social network; players with lower “network constraints” had much better ideas through an exposure to weak ties not common to an insulated social experience. His 2001 survey of managers showed how organizational players who were positioned to experience different ideas, concepts, and people via new social networks, tended to produce valuable and innovative ideas themselves. The key component to Burt’s observation is the actors willingness to connect, to form social ties and create social capital. Social homophily of the organization is overcome by actively reaching out and making new contacts.

Mario Luis Small “Unanticipated Gains”: considers organizations as existing inside of social networks (embeddedness approach), such that resources of the organization reflect the social network it is inside of. He observed that deliberate personal networking within organizations was less important to creating social capital than whether the organizational structures and practices aided the opportunities of members to interact, thus influencing tie formation and the quality and quantity of social interactions. His study of poor mothers at child care centers (2009) showed that the effectiveness of moms social networks was not simply a matter of initiating contact (Burt), but more so the context and conditions under which the connections were made, over which formal organizations have significant influence.

Classic economic theory assumes (very basically) that efficiency is the primary factor in social construct, yet Shareholder Value came to dominate corporate America regardless of its tremendous lack of organizational and economic effective and rejection by the seasoned institutional investors whom it most favored. Yes- there was deregulation, and the expected crisis + need = opportunity, but that alone does not explain the rise of Shareholder Value dominance. Considering its shortcomings as an effective economic model, it’s diffusion is best understood as isomorphic. From a cultural/cognitive perspective, what occurred was a social movement that reoriented and reframed the “problems and solutions” facing American business, offering Shareholder Value as the new dominate orientation and new model of control.

In 1980, institutional investors, economists, managers, and scholars were either against Shareholder Value or had never heard of it, yet year by year each group came to extoll Shareholder Value. Heilbon Verheul & Quak documented this industry-wide adoption, detailing how consultants (1984), Economic Journals (1985), investors (1986) and economists (1987), soon fell in line with this new new social order as each player sought to stay relevant and gain acceptance and legitimacy, even acting as if they had known about it – and supported it – all along. This cognitive/cultural interpretation is supported by DiMaggio and Powell who argue that legitimacy and interdependence are more important then efficiency and competition in determining organizational behavior.

Shareholder Value dominance solved problems that were not economic, but rather issues of uncertainty, creating a new mental model that dominated corporate America.